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Spying Inc.
Danielle Keats Citron
Abstract
The latest spying craze is the “stalking app.” Once installed on
someone’s cell phone, the stalking app can provide continuous
access to the phone owner’s calls, texts, snapchats, photos, calendar
updates, and movements. Stalking apps destroy the privacy and
confidentiality of cell phone activities. Domestic abusers and
stalkers frequently turn to stalking apps because they are
undetectable even to sophisticated phone owners.
Business is booming for stalking app providers, even though
their entire enterprise is arguably illegal. Federal and state
wiretapping laws ban the manufacture, sale, or advertisement of
devices knowing their design makes them primarily useful for the
surreptitious interception of electronic communications. But those
laws are rarely, if ever, enforced. Existing law may be too restrictive
to make a real difference.
A legal agenda is essential to combating the growth of stalking
software. We need to update criminal and civil penalties facing
providers. Record-keeping requirements could help decrease the
demand for spyware. Private rights of action, if recognized, could
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help secure redress and deterrence. To increase the likelihood that
the law will be enforced, states and localities need more training
and digital forensic expertise. The private sector could reinforce
these efforts by offering devices that can resist the installation of
spyware.
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I. Introduction
Private spying is a booming business. A rapidly growing sector
of the surveillance economy involves the provision of spyware, a
type of malware installed on someone’s device without knowledge
or consent. Spyware providers earn monthly fees for providing
secret, real-time access to a networked device owner’s
communications and activities.1
1. See Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk, Control Domestic
Violence
Victims,
NPR
(Sept.
15,
2014,
4:22
PM),
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The “stalking app” is the private spy’s current tool of choice.2
Search Google for “cell phone spy,” and an array of advertisements
appear.3 “Worried about your spouse cheating? Track EVERY text,
EVERY call and EVERY move they make using our EASY Cell
Phone Spy Software,” explained one provider.4
The privacy invasions enabled by such surveillance software
are breathtaking.
Some stalking apps are devoted to tracking a phone owner’s
geolocation data—the street and city where a phone is present.5
Geolocation data tells us far more than points on a map. In her
concurrence in United States v. Jones,6 Justice Sonia Sotomayor
warned that monitoring a person’s public movements “reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”7
Other stalking apps offer an even more revealing picture of
someone’s daily activities. With these apps, subscribers can
monitor everything phone owners do with their devices. In real
time, subscribers can listen to a phone owner’s calls and video
chats; they can view their texts, photos, calendars, contacts, and

http://www.npr.org/sections/alttechconsidered/2014/09/15/346149979/smartphon
es-are-used-to-stalk-domestic-abuse-victims (last visited Sept. 20, 2015)
(providing an overview of how smartphones are utilized to spy on domestic abuse
victims) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Cahal Milmo, Exclusive: Abusers Using Spyware Apps to Monitor
Partners Reaches ‘Epidemic Proportions,’ THE INDEP. (Dec. 26, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-abusers-usingspyware-apps-to-monitor-partners-reaches-epidemic-proportions-9945881.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (detailing the increasing popularity of spyware
applications) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Appendix, Exhibit A (showing the results for such an internet
search).
4. See Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. (2014) (statement of Cindy Southworth, Vice President of the National
Network to End Domestic Violence on behalf of the Minnesota Coalition for
Battered Women) [hereinafter Southworth Testimony] (describing how spyware
apps target domestic violence victims).
5. See id. (explaining how certain apps function).
6. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
7. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (warning of the hazards of
location monitoring).
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browsing habits.8 Targeted phones can be turned into bugging
devices; conversations within a fifteen-foot radius of a phone are
recorded and uploaded to the provider’s portal. As FlexiSpy tells
subscribers, “[b]ug their room: listen in on their phone’s
surroundings and listen in on what is really going on behind closed
doors.”9
A key selling point of stalking apps is their hidden nature.10
Subscribers are assured that, once they download the spyware app
to someone’s phone, the phone owner will be unable to detect the
spyware.11 Stalking apps are advertised as “100% undetectable.”12
FlexiSPY promises “total control of your partner’s phone without
them knowing it. . . . See exactly where they are, or were, at any
given date or time.”13 Cellphone Spying stresses:
[w]hat this app . . . can do is capture that information for
retrieval at a later date—without the target phone user ever
knowing anything about it! As with all its functionality, the user
of the targeted phone will have no clue that their phone has
been compromised or that their data is getting leaked to
somebody else.14

8. Saiyai Sakawee, This App Lets Men with “Several Girlfriends” Spy on
Their Significant Others’ Every Move, TECH IN ASIA (Dec. 11, 2013, 7:00 PM),
https://www.techinasia.com/app-lets-men-several-girlfriends-spy-significantothers-move/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (listing the range of functions that
applications offer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. FLEXISPY, http://www.flexispy.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See id. (marketing itself as a spy app).
11. mSpyVIP, Cell Phone Spy – mSpy Review, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNbT0At4Tsg (last visited Sept. 20, 2015)
(detailing one such spyware app) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
12. See Southworth Testimony, supra note 4 (describing the advertising
tactics of spyware apps).
13. See Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. (2014) (statement of Chairman Franken) [hereinafter, Franken Statement]
(discussing the tools that are advertised).
14. See How Do Cell Spying Apps Work?, CELLSPYINGHQ (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://cellspyinghq.com/how-do-cell-spying-programs-work/ (last visited Sept. 20,
2015) (detailing the apps’ unique tools) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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HelloSpy claims that its app “silently monitor[s] text messages,
GPS locations, call details, photos, and social media activity.”15
Users are assured that the app “does not display any icons and
appears on the device application database under different names
(system processes), which leaves virtually no chance for the user to
identify this software.”16
Cyber stalking apps and their ilk thus enable continuous and
secret tracking of a cell phone owner’s intimate conversations,
medical appointments, online banking activity, intellectual
musings, minute-to-minute movements, and far more. As the
Court underscored in Riley v. California,17 with access to someone’s
cell phone, a viewer can reconstruct the “sum of an individual’s
private life.”18
Although providers often emphasize that parents and
employers could use their apps to check on children and employees,
stalkers and domestic abusers are often their targeted audience.19
National Network to End Domestic Violence’s (NNEDV) Vice
President Cindy Southworth explains that “some developers try to
mask their nefarious intentions by mentioning child safety or
employee safety once or twice, but their true focus is obvious when
they reiterate on every page how their products are completely
hidden and work in stealth mode.”20
If one digs at all, it becomes clear that stealth surveillance of
ex-intimates is a key goal.21 Stalking apps are hailed as the “spy in
15. HELLOSPY, hellospy.com (last visited June 20, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Southworth Testimony, supra note 4 (explaining how the companies
focus their advertising on the undiscoverability of the app).
17. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
18. See id. at 2489 (discussing the effects of long-term surveillance).
19. See Appendix, Exhibit B (showing an advertisement targeting
individuals interested in spying on their spouses).
20. Senate Bill Would Ban Stalking Apps and Save Women’s Lives, NAT’L
NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (June 4, 2014), http://nnedv.org/news/4296senate-bill-would-ban-stalking-apps-and-save-women-s-lives.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. Cellphone Spying, a site about stealth spying on intimates, links to
PhoneWatcher.net, which in turn links to the spyware provider mSpy. mSpy says
that 40% of users are parents and 10 to 15% are small businesses monitoring
employees but is silent about the remaining 45 to 50% of its customers. See Kate
Knibbs, Smartphone Spying Startup Will Keep an Eye on NYC, DAILY DOT (Feb.
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[a cheating spouse’s] pocket.”22 FlexiSPY advertisements
prominently feature a photo of a couple next to the message: “many
spouses cheat. They all use cell phones. Their phones will tell you
what they won’t.”23 The advertisement continues, “Women who do
cheat usually do so in a well-planned and discrete [sic] fashion,
making it exceedingly difficult for their man to know they’re being
cuckolded. . . . Women are much more capable of looking you
straight in the eye and lying.”24 A marketing video for a stalking
app asked, “So you want to keep an eye on your loved one or your
employees, because you suspect they’re hiding something and it
might get too late?”25 Another app provider’s advertisement
includes “a photo of a woman whose face was marked with ugly
abrasions and whose forearm was held in the grip of a man.”26
Finally, mSpy emphasizes that its software app helps people catch
cheating wives.27
Much of this activity is illegal.28 Intercepting electronic
communications without at least one party’s consent violates
27, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/mspy-goes-to-nyc/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2015) (discussing how various spy apps are intertwined) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In March 2014, mSpy’s website demonstrated
the service with a man tracking the communications and whereabouts of his wife
and son. See E.J. Dickson, To Catch a Cheater: 6 Apps for Spying on Your
Significant Other, DAILY DOT (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/
love-surveillance-spying-apps/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (listing spy apps that
are currently available and the services offered by each) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See Dickson, supra note 21 (discussing the advertising techniques used
by various apps).
23. FLEXISPY, supra note 9. Under the caption “Catch Cheaters,” Flexispy
asks, “Is your wife or husband cheating on you? For the sake of your mental and
sexual health, you have a right to know if your partner is being responsible. Spy
on their cellphones to know.” Id.
24. Milmo, supra note 2.
25. STEALTH GENIE, StealthGenie—World's Most Powerful Cell Phone Spy
Software, YOUTUBE (2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YycVKHOC
p0M&list=UUi2qZEeLu4x7-eH70o52njQ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. Kim Zetter, The Criminal Indictment That Could Finally Hit Spyware
Makers Hard, WIRED (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/stealthgenieindictment/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
27. See mSpyVIP, supra note 11 (advertising the benefits of its application).
28. See infra note 132 (listing various state statutes regulating cyber
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federal and state wiretap laws.29 At the federal level, and in most
states, cyber stalking is a crime.30 But, bringing criminal law to
bear against individual perpetrators is challenging. Spyware apps
are hard to detect; so then is the criminal surveillance.
Even when stalking victims suspect that their phones are
being monitored, their complaints to law enforcement are seldom
pursued. Police departments often lack the forensic equipment
necessary to examine mobile devices for stalking apps.31 Reports
often go nowhere because domestic violence and stalking are low
priorities for law enforcement. Police officers receive little training
on the relevant laws and the technology necessary to investigate
such crimes.32 Because both the law and the technology are not
well understood, law enforcement does little beyond advising
victims to get rid of their phones.33 Resources to fund digital
forensic investigations are especially scarce at the state and local
level.34 Then too, the lack of cooperation between jurisdictions may
prevent the apprehension of stalkers.35
What about the parties responsible for providing spyware and
other covert surveillance tools? Under federal law, it is a crime to
manufacture, sell, or advertise a device knowing or having reason
surveillance).
29. See infra note 132 (listing the ways in which states have attempted to
regulate the monitoring of cyber communications).
30. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, H ATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 123–25 (2014).
31. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Privacy, Technology and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
(2014) (statement of Detective Brian Hill, Criminal Investigations Division,
Anoka County Sheriff’s Office) [hereinafter Hill Testimony].
32. See CITRON, supra note 30, at 83–87 (exploring the ways in which law
enforcement officials handle cyber stalking). The Attorney General of California
Kamala Harris has been working hard to address this problem in her state. I am
working with her Task Force on Cyber Exploitation on efforts to educate law
enforcement about cyber stalking. Funds are being diverted to enhance law
enforcement’s digital forensic expertise in California. Telephone Interview with
then Special Attorney General Jeffrey Rabkin (notes on file with author).
33. See id. at 83–85 (discussing the issues that law enforcement officials
face when dealing with cyber stalking)
34. See id. at 88–89 (explaining the various challenges that plague law
enforcement).
35. See id. (noting the coordination required between agencies for successful
enforcement of cyber-related laws).

1250

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2015)

to know that the design of the device renders it “primarily useful”
for the covert interception of electronic, wire, or oral
communications.36 Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia
have similar criminal statutes.37 At least in theory then, the
providers of stalking apps could face federal and state criminal
charges if it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that they
knew or had reason to know the apps were designed to be
“primarily useful” for secret surveillance.
The prosecution of businesses involved in the manufacture
and sale of stalking apps could be a crucial deterrent, but that
possibility has not yet been realized. There have been few, if any,
state prosecutions against the entities providing covert
surveillance tools and a modest number at the federal level. If law
enforcement initiated more investigations, the law might only
cover a narrow set of devices or tools: those whose design renders
them “primarily useful” for the interception of electronic, wire, or
oral communications. Existing law does not ban the interception of
location data.
Although the Federal Trade Commission has brought a
handful of enforcement actions against spyware providers for
engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices, and a few state
Attorneys General have done the same, stalking app providers
have paid little attention.38 Such services continue to proliferate;
their ads brazenly appear online.39
Something more must be done. Software secretly tracking a
phone’s activities exacts profound costs to privacy while serving no
legitimate purpose. Aided by spyware, abusers can find victims
who are desperately trying to escape them. Victims of domestic
abuse have been beaten and killed. When victims learn that their
phones are the source of their vulnerability, the emotional fallout
is profound. Stalking victims lose their sense of personal safety.
They experience anxiety at the thought of being under surveillance
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (2012).
37. See infra note 132 (listing the various state codes).
38. See infra Part III.B. (discussing various law enforcement efforts
including those by the Federal Trade Commission).
39. See Exhibits A, B (displaying two stereotypical online advertisements for
stalking apps).
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by their stalkers. New phones must be purchased, and time must
be spent devising new passwords and accounts.40 Many victims
lack the resources to purchase new phones. If an abuser tracks a
domestic violence victim to a shelter, other victims staying at the
shelter are at risk.41
Domestic abusers and stalkers are increasingly turning to
surveillance software to terrorize victims. A Bureau of Justice
Statistics study conducted in 2006 estimated that 25,000 people
are stalked via GPS annually.42 That number surely understates
the problem given the increasing adoption of cell phones and
availability of stalking apps.43 Consider these studies. The
National Network to End Domestic Violence found that 71% of
domestic abusers monitor survivors’ computer activities, and 54%
of abusers tracked survivors’ cell phones with stalking apps.44
According to a 2012 survey of 750 victim services agencies, 75% of
domestic violence survivors experience tracking of their location
through their cell phones or a GPS device.45 A 2014 study
sponsored by Digital Trust found that more than 50% of abusive
partners used spyware or some other form of electronic
surveillance to stalk victims.46 The overall number of stalking
victims is significant and growing; in 2009, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics estimated that over 3.4 million individuals are stalked
annually;47 in 2014, the Department of Justice’s Bea Hanson
testified that 6.6 million people are stalked annually.48
40. See Hill Testimony, supra note 31 (discussing how individuals handle
being targets of surveillance).
41. Much thanks to Rachel Levinson-Waldman for her expertise and insights
on these matters.
42. KATRINA BAUM, SHANNA CATALANO, MICHAEL RAND & KRISTINA ROSE,
STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2009).
43. The Department of Justice may no longer be a resource for data about
GPS stalking. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Justice Statistics survey has
eliminated inquiry into the prevalence of GPS stalking.
44. SAFETY NET TECHNOLOGY SAFETY SURVEY, A GLIMPSE FROM THE FIELD:
HOW ABUSERS ARE MISUSING TECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE (2014).
45. Southworth Testimony, supra note 4.
46. Milmo, supra note 2.
47. BAUM, supra note 42, at 8.
48. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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Despite the dangers, surveillance software remains widely
available for purchase by domestic abusers and stalkers.49 The
risks of stalking apps will only escalate over time as our smart
phones are connected to even more revealing information, such as
biometric measuring devices and home appliances.
This Essay proposes a legal agenda aimed to curtail the
enablers of private spies—the businesses manufacturing, selling,
or advertising spyware and other stealth surveillance equipment.
Given the difficulty of finding stalkers due to the surreptitious
nature of surveillance tools, the producers of such software are a
crucial source of punishment and deterrence. The question is how
might we improve the law, its enforcement, and other non-legal
efforts.
Legal reforms are needed to combat the production of cyber
stalking apps. Current criminal law may be too narrow and overly
restrictive to combat the stalking app industry. The provision of
devices secretly collecting location data should be banned. Also,
criminal law should extend to the purveyors of devices whose
design renders them “useful” for secret surveillance. Another
potential reform is to require app providers to collect records on
subscribers so that private spies can be found and caught. On the
civil side, individuals should be given a private right of action
against the purveyors of cyber stalking software.
Legal reform should be paired with efforts to enhance law
enforcement. More resources should be dedicated to training law
enforcement and to digital forensic expertise. Criminal law has no
chance of serving as a deterrent if it is never pursued. State
Attorneys General should prioritize enforcement actions against
spyware providers under their unfair and deceptive practice laws.
To be clear about this paper’s scope, this Essay does not
address government surveillance. In a series of articles, David
Gray and I have explored government’s mass data collection,
analysis, and sharing.50 We have proposed a right to quantitative
Privacy, Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014)
(statement of Bea Hanson, Principal Deputy Dir., Dep’t of Justice Office of
Violence Against Women).
49. BAUM, supra note 42, at 8.
50. See generally David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to
Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); David Gray & Danielle Keats
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privacy to strike a better balance between individual and collective
expectations of privacy and law enforcement’s interest in
preventing, detecting, and prosecuting terrorism and crimes. This
Essay leaves aside the collection, use, and sharing of personal data
for legitimate commercial ends, which I have explored in other
work.
Part II sets the stage with a brief history of the industry
involved in the secret surveillance of individuals’ confidential
communications. It discusses the development of tools facilitating
the continuous, indiscriminate, and secret surveillance of
individuals for private, criminal ends. Part III asks what current
law does about the production of surveillance tools. It explores the
gaps in legal protections and the under-enforcement of existing
law. Part IV offers a legal agenda to combat the problem of private
spying. It calls for an expansion of criminal and civil law and for
more training and resources to ensure the enforcement of existing
laws. Part IV concludes by addressing potential non-legal
strategies.
II. The Private Surveillance Business
A. Evolution of the Spying Trade
Human beings are inherently curious. Gossip has long been a
common pastime.51 Predictably then, as soon as telegraphs and
telephones became available for purchase, so did devices designed
to
intercept
confidential
telephone
and
telegraph
communications.52 In the early 1900s, telephone wiretap devices
Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory
of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381 (2013); David Gray,
Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United
States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745 (2013); Danielle Keats Citron
& David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor
Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F ORUM 262 (2013); Danielle Keats Citron &
Frank Pasquale, 62 Network Accountability for the Domestic Surveillance State,
62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011).
51. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE , T HE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP ,
RUMOR , AND PRIVACY ON THE I NTERNET (2007) (exploring the history of gossip).
52. See SAMUEL DASH, T HE I NTRUDERS : U NREASONABLE S EARCHES AND
SEIZURES FROM KING J OHN TO J OHN ASHCROFT 79 (2004) (providing a history of
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were widely advertised and sold.53 Businesses and individuals
bought them to spy on competitors, employees, and spouses.54
Over time, spying tools grew in variety and sophistication.55
In the 1940s and 1950s, mail order catalogs sold location trackers,
spy cameras, bugging devices, radio pills, and tiny tape recorders.56
Available for purchase were bugging devices hidden in martini
olives, suitcase handles, earrings, and tie clasps.57 Miniature
bugging devices could broadcast conversations to a receiver a block
away.58 Parabolic microphones could pick up voices without being
placed on the premises.59 Catalogs sought to avoid entanglement
with the law by warning buyers to use bugging tools “according to
the laws of your community.”60
The low cost of spying devices fueled their widespread
adoption.61 Businesses installed microphones in the walls of
employee restrooms and desks.62 Model homes and car salesrooms
were equipped with hidden bugs to allow salespeople to overhear
the musings of prospective buyers.63 Husbands bugged their wives’

surveillance devices throughout history). During the Civil War, military
telegraph messages were routinely intercepted. Id. After the war’s end, telegraph
operators got into the private wiretapping business. Id.
53. Alan F. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a
Legislative Solution, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 168 (1957).
54. Id.
55. See DASH, supra note 52, at 85 (providing a history of surveillance
techniques); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967) (discussing the
expansion of “detection techniques”).
56. See ALAN W ESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 90, 98 (1967) (discussing
surveillance tools available over the decades).
57. See id. (listing the various products available to consumers).
58. See MYRON BRENTON, T HE P RIVACY I NVADERS 152 (1964) (discussing the
efficacy of certain surveillance devices).
59. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 47 (explaining how the technology used functions
in practice).
60. See BRENTON, supra note 58, at 155 (discussing how surveillance
technology was advertised in the past).
61. To the tune of $250. Id. at 153.
62. See DASH, supra note 52, at 84 (discussing how businesses took
advantage of new surveillance technology).
63. See id. at 85 (explaining how businesses could use surveillance devices
for their own commercial advantage).
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bedrooms and wiretapped their home phones; wives wiretapped
and bugged their husbands’ offices.64
Early bugging devices faced objections and legal restrictions.
As Part II explores, states and Congress barred nonconsensual
wiretapping, but the laws were limited in their reach and hardly
ever enforced.
B. Private Spying 2.0
The martini listening device, telephone bug, and parabolic
microphone are quaint by modern standards. Today’s spying tools
can provide a comprehensive picture of someone’s minute-tominute activities, from the sacred to the quotidian. In a dragnet
style, they produce a continuous record of a person’s movements,
communications, online browsing, reading habits, searches,
snapchats, videos, and more in real time.65 Thanks to falling
storage costs, it is cheap to preserve a continuous record of our
intellectual, economic, political, social, and physical pursuits.
Cell phones are gold mines for the spying business. Every time
a person’s phone generates media content, the content is uploaded
to the spyware subscriber’s account for remote viewing. Through a
web portal, users can view the person’s calendar entries, Facebook
posts, address book, photos, videos, online activities, text
messages, call logs, emails, snapchats, and location. The watcher
can turn the person’s phone into a bugging device and pick up his
or her conversations.66 Cell phone owners will have no reason to
suspect the surveillance because spyware is designed to be
undetectable.67
In the near future, far more information will be linked to
mobile personal devices. Already on the market are fitness exercise
64. See id. (noting that surveillance devices also had an impact
domestically).
65. See Part II (introducing various cyber surveillance applications and how
they operate).
66. See Knibbs, supra note 21 (discussing the powers given to an individual
using spyware).
67. United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 4, United States v. Akbar, 2014 WL 7692300 (No. 1:14CV-1273), (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2014).
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bands that link to our phones, tracking our heart rate and exercise.
Soon, cell phones will be connected to our home appliances, alarms,
and more.
We have some sense of the businesses involved in spyware.68
Let’s consider a few examples. mSpy, a U.K. company with a New
York office, sells a mobile app that facilitates the stealth
monitoring of a person’s phone activity. According to mSpy, 74% of
its users are male. The most active users are between thirty-five to
forty-four years old, and 53% live in the United States. Texans and
Californians drive the most traffic to mSpy’s website.69 mSpy says
that parents make up 40% of its users and that employers
constitute 10 to 15% of its user base. mSpy has said nothing about
the remaining 45 or 50% of its customers. In March 2014, mSpy’s
website demonstrated the service with a man tracking the
communications and whereabouts of his wife and son.70
Highster Mobile allows users to “secretly track and spy on
virtually any cell phone quickly and easily completely
undetected.”71 On YouTube, a Highster Mobile subscriber hailed
the spyware for helping him catch his wife cheating: “Without this
software, I would not have been able to know that my suspicions
about her cheating was [sic] correct.”72 A Highster Mobilesponsored user review page included several reviews applauding
the app’s utility in stalking intimates. One person wrote, “It
doesn’t work very well, but [I] did receive enough text messages to
know she is cheating on me, not with 1 guy but 3, what a
68. Just to name a few: iSpyoo, SpyBubble, Highster, mSpy, Cell Phone Spy,
and Spy to Mobile. Leah Wightley, Highster Mobile Review, YOUTUBE (Aug. 19,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2Bs5ABMRoA (last visited Sept. 20,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. Molly Mulshine, Watch What You Text: iPhone Surveillance Startup
Moves to NYC, BETABEAT (Feb. 26, 2014), news.yahoo.com/watch-text-iphonesurveillance-startup-moves-nyc-220815427.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. Dickson, supra note 21.
71. Remote Cell Phone Tracker and Spy, HIGHSTER MOBILE,
http://www.highstermobi.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. louiseramirez88, Best Cell Phone Spying Tool, How I Find Out that My
Wife Was CHEATING!!, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2013), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=X0CIhdDbChY (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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woman!!”73 Still another said, “Highster Mobile literally changed
my life after I found my suspicions were correct. I’m now living in
a different country and having the time of my life. I am free!!!”74
YouTube users reviewing the app said it is great to use to watch
your “cheating spouse” or your kids.75
C. Perils of Spyware
Spyware apps allow stalkers and domestic abusers to terrorize
victims. Physical harm is a serious peril when abusers have access
to victims’ activities and whereabouts. A woman fled her abuser
with whom she was living in Kansas.76 Because the woman’s
abuser had installed a cyber-stalking app on her phone, he knew
that she had moved to Elgin, Illinois.77 The man tracked the
woman to a shelter and then a friend’s home where he assaulted
her.78 In another case, a woman tried to escape her abusive
husband, but because he had installed a stalking app on her phone,
he was able to find her and her children. After tracking them down,
the man murdered his two children.79 In 2013, a California man,
using a spyware app, tracked a woman to her friend’s house and
attacked her.80
In addition to the serious physical risks posed by abusers’
access to spyware, imagine the chilling of expression and anxiety
that ensues when stalking victims discover that their abusers have
real-time access to their communications, searches, photos, books
on reading apps, snapchats, social network messages, activity on
73. Highster
Mobile
Reviews,
TOP 10 SPY SOFTWARE REV.,
http://www.top10spysoftware.com/review/highstermobile (last visited June 20,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. Id.
75. Highster Mobile Review, Highster Mobile 3: What You Need to Know
Before
You
Buy
Highster
Mobile,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
29,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUvvVx06iLw (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. Franken Statement, supra note 13.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Southworth Testimony, supra note 4.
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dating apps, and steps taken—for days, weeks, and months.
According to NNEDV’s Cindy Southworth, abusers’ goal is to
assert control over victims, and it works.81 As victims have told law
enforcement, even if they obtain new phones, they no longer feel
safe using them. What is to stop their abusers from reinstalling
spyware on their phones? Victims become paranoid about using
networked technologies for work, socializing, and public
conversations, lest their abusers track them down. They
experience distress about being watched.82
That sort of chilling implicates our intellectual privacy.83 Once
individuals become aware that their communications have been
under surveillance, they may internalize the notion of being
listened to and watched. Individual development is inevitably
stunted in the face of unwanted monitoring.
Finally, stalking apps can be used to facilitate financial
crimes. For instance, they can be used to steal sensitive personal
information like social security numbers and passwords to assist
in identity theft. Secretly installed spyware provides users access
to a victim’s bank passwords that can be used to empty accounts.84
If victims lose their financial cushion, the harm that they
experience will be far worse and their options more limited.85
81. Aarti Sahani, Domestic Abusers Use Cellphones to Stalk, Abuse, and
Control, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/
alltechconsidered/2014/09/15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-controldomestic-abuse-victims (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
82. Studies have shown that people experience anxiety about being watched
and misunderstood. See generally Stuart A. Karabenick & John R. Knapp, Effects
of Computer Privacy on Help-Seeking, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 461 (1988)
(analyzing the effects of cyber surveillance).
83. See generally N EIL M. RICHARDS , I NTELLECTUAL PRIVACY : RETHINKING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015); J ULIE E. COHEN, C ONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF : L AW, C ODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 141 (2012);
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013);
Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Julie E. Cohen,
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1425–26 (2000).
84. Preliminary Injunctive Order, F.T.C. v. CyberSpy Software LLC, No. 08CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2008/ 11/081128cyberspypi.pdf.
85. Southworth Testimony, supra note 4, at 15.
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III. Law’s Role Combating Spying Inc.
“Few threats to liberty exist . . . greater than that posed
by . . . eavesdropping devices.”86

Congress and half of the states have adopted bans on the
business side of illegal eavesdropping, but the enforcement of those
laws has been lackluster. This Part begins by laying out some key
developments in wiretapping law. Then, it highlights federal and
state prohibitions on the manufacture, sale, and advertisement of
certain surveillance devices. The enforcement of those laws and
their limits are explored. This Part ends by discussing the role that
federal and state consumer protection agencies have begun to play
in curtailing the production of spyware.
A. Historical Development of Wiretapping Laws
In the mid-nineteenth century, a handful of states banned
surreptitious wiretapping of telegraph communications. California
passed the first criminal prohibition in 1862.87 Telegraph
wiretapping bans were soon extended to include wiretaps on
telephones.88
The Supreme Court heard its first wiretapping case in 1928.
In Olmstead v. United States,89 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the
majority, ruled that government interception of private telephone
communications did not implicate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.90 The Court
reasoned that “projected voices” did not constitute “actual physical
invasions” of the home warranting Fourth Amendment
protection.91 Because government agents cut into defendant’s
telephone wires outside his home and had not trespassed inside it,
86. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
87. Id. at 45–46.
88. Id. California extended its prohibition of telegraph wiretapping to
telephone wiretapping in 1905. DASH, supra note 52, at 81.
89. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
90. See id. at 466 (“[T]he wiretapping here disclosed did not amount to a
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
91. Id.
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no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, the Court held.92
The fact that federal law enforcement had violated state
wiretapping law was irrelevant.93
As the Court noted in Olmstead, Congress could ban
warrantless wiretaps to fill in the gaps left by the Constitution.94
Federal lawmakers did just that in the Federal Communications
Act of 1934.95 Section 605 of the Communications Act banned the
interception of radio or wire communications and the disclosure of
the content of such communications absent the consent of one of
the parties.96 The use of devices to secretly record face-to-face
communications in private places was not banned.97
As a practical matter, the Communications Act offered scant
protection against wiretapping. The Department of Justice
interpreted § 605 to mean that law enforcement could engage in
wiretapping if it did not divulge material obtained via wiretaps to
others.98 Because that interpretation was backed by judicial
decisions, law enforcement regularly used wiretapping equipment
in investigations. Private parties rarely faced prosecution under
either federal or state law because it seemed difficult to justify

92. Id.
93. See id. at 468–69 (“Whether the state of Washington may prosecute and
punish federal officers violating this law . . . is not before us.”).
94. Id. at 465. Justice Brandeis wrote a powerful dissent that took the
majority to task for linking Fourth Amendment protection to outmoded property
rights. Id. at 473–74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). A property-based approach failed
to protect citizens from procedures that might not require the “force and violence”
necessary to invade property, but nonetheless compromised the sanctity of
citizens’ thoughts, beliefs, emotions as well as the “individual security” they
invested in activities like telephone conversations. Id. at 473–74, 478–79
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). As Justice Brandeis underscored, telephone
communications are more private and confidential than tangible objects in the
home. Compared to telephone wiretaps, general warrants and writs of assistance
were “but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression.” Id. at 476. Fourth
Amendment understandings needed to evolve to address scientific advances that
permitted government agents to invade our most private and intimate
information without physically intruding on the home.
95. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615(b) (2012).
96. Id. § 605.
97. DASH, supra note 52, at 83.
98. WESTIN, supra note 56, at 177.

SPYING INC.

1261

criminal charges against individuals when law enforcement
engaged in the same activity.99
In 1967, two Supreme Court decisions—Katz v. United
States100 and Berger v. New York101—changed the trajectory of
electronic surveillance law. In those cases, the Supreme Court
overturned Olmstead, ruling that electronic surveillance
constituted a search and seizure governed by the Fourth
Amendment.102 Under Katz, surveillance focused on the
interception of a few conversations was constitutionally acceptable
if the interception was approved by a judge and based on a special
showing of need.103 By contrast, lengthy, continuous, and
indiscriminate electronic surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment.104
Katz involved an investigation of a man allegedly running an
illegal betting operation.105 Agents listened to the man’s calls by
attaching a suction microphone to a telephone booth’s roof.106 Katz
was convicted based on evidence gathered by the microphone.107
The Court held that using a listening device to monitor telephone
conversations in a public phone booth constituted a Fourth
Amendment “search.”108 In rejecting the trespass requirement, the
Court declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”109 The Court found that conversations in telephone booths
99. Id. at 179, 186.
100. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
101. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
102. Id. at 50–82.
103. See generally James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital
Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 65 (1997).
104. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
105. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348–49 (1967) (providing the
facts of the case).
106. See id. (describing how the FBI had obtained evidence in the case).
107. See id. at 353 (“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search
and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
108. See id. (finding that the government had violated Katz’s reasonable
expectation of privacy).
109. Id. at 351.
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deserve Fourth Amendment protection because citizens expect
that their telephone conversations are just as secure from public
review as their daily routines in the home.110 The Court noted that
phone booths function as spaces of aural repose.111 Citizens could
reasonably expect that their conversations in telephone booths
would not be monitored by “uninvited ear[s],” even if they can be
seen by “intruding eye[s].”112 Declining to extend Fourth
Amendment protection would unsettle these broadly held
expectations and raise the specter of a surveillance state.113 In
Berger, the Court made clear that “the fantastic advances in the
field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the
privacy of the individual.”114 The Court held that wiretapping
statutes needed to include special privacy protections for
governmental monitoring to pass constitutional muster because
the indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance devices was
reminiscent of the reviled general warrant.115
In the shadow of Berger and Katz, Congress passed the Title
III Wiretap Act of 1968 and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.116 Title III laid out a regime of
protections “to compensate for the uniquely intrusive aspects of
electronic surveillance.”117 Law enforcement had to meet stringent
warrant requirements to intercept telephone calls over the wires.
110. See id. at 351–52 (emphasizing the expectation of privacy).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 352.
113. Id. at 354–59.
114. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 41–62 (1967).
115. See id. at 47 (ruling that wiretapping raised special Fourth Amendment
concerns because it involved continuous intrusions, searches, seizures, and the
indiscriminate monitoring of communications over a period of time without
connection to the crime under investigation, unlike the limited intrusion of a
traditional search).
116. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
82 Stat. 197. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act extended the Title III’s
protections to wireless voice communications and voice communications of a nonvoice nature, such as e-mail or other computer-to-computer transmissions.
117. Dempsey, supra note 103, at 71. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation
Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 379 (2014) (discussing
provisions of Title III that provide exceptions when wiretapping is legal without
a court order and set forth procedures for lawful interception pursuant to a court
order).
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Law enforcement could obtain wiretap orders only on a showing of
special need, a predicate felony offense, and high-level Justice
Department or state approval.118 Wiretap orders had to be
narrowly tailored and time limited.119 Officers had to “minimize”
the interception of innocent conversations.120 Such minimization
was deemed essential to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement, making up for the fact that law
enforcement was getting access to all of the target’s
communications, including those unconnected to the crime under
investigation.121 Wiretaps falling short of these requirements were
banned.122
B. Cutting Off the Source: Section 2512 and Analogous State
Statutes
Congress did not focus solely on government surveillance.
Federal lawmakers made it a crime for private individuals to
engage in secret wiretapping. Under Title III, it is a felony to
intercept electronic communications unless one of the parties to a
communication consented to the interception.123 In passing Title
III, legislators recognized that private spies would be difficult to
identify. After all, eavesdropping equipment is designed to ensure
that those under surveillance do not know about it.
To enhance Title III’s deterrent effect, Congress included a
provision covering those involved in the manufacture, sale, and
advertisement of covert surveillance devices. The idea was to “dry

118. See Kerr, supra note 117, at 380.
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), (5) (2012) (requiring that orders authorizing
wiretaps be for the shortest duration necessary).
120. Id. § 2518(5).
121. Dempsey, supra note 103, at 70.
122. For a thoughtful exploration of the significance of Title III and Katz, see
generally Susan Freiwald, A First Principles Approach of Communications’
Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). Most states follow this approach, though twelve
states criminalize the interception of electronic communications unless both
parties to the communication consent to the interception. Paul Ohm, The Rise and
Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1485 (2009).

1264

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2015)

up the source of equipment highly useful for surveillance.”124
Section 2512 made it a crime to intentionally manufacture, sell, or
advertise a device knowing or having reason to know that its
design renders it “primarily useful” for the surreptitious
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.125
Defendants face fines of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of
not more than five years or both.
Section 2512 covers a “narrow category of devices whose
principal use is likely to be for wiretapping or eavesdropping.”126 A
surveillance device must be “sufficiently invasive or devious in
purpose to warrant criminal prosecution.”127 The inquiry focuses
on the degree to which a device’s components render it useful for
the secret interception of communications.128 Disclaimers that
customers should be advised of the law do not immunize
defendants from conviction.129 A defendant cannot avoid penalties
under § 2512 “by surrounding himself with disclaimers and closing
his eyes to the [surreptitious] nature and use of the devices.”130
Section 2512’s safe harbor exempts entities that supply
surveillance equipment to government agencies or communication
providers.131 For instance, the manufacture of network packet
sniffers seemingly falls outside of § 2512 because the device helps
broadband providers detect network intrusion attempts, identify
misuse by internal and external users, monitor network usage, and
filter suspect content from network traffic. The provision of packet
124. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2183 (1968).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (2012).
126. United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting 1968
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2112, 2183–84). Although Title III did not
provide examples of devices on lawmakers’ minds, the Senate Report
accompanying the statute included a non-exhaustive list of banned devices like
the martini olive transmitter, spike mike, and microphones hidden in pens and
calculators. Id. at 2112, 2184.
127. Id.
128. Id. That inquiry focuses on the “particular characteristics of the device
at issue.” Id. Expert testimony may be useful to prove that a device is primarily
designed for stealth use. United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 602 (C.D. Ill.
1986).
129. United States v. Brio, 143 F.3d 1421, 1429 (11th Cir. 1998).
130. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. at 606 .
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(2)(a), (b) (2012).
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sniffers does not run afoul of the law because it is used in the
normal course of a communication provider’s business.
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted
similar statutes.132 Most state laws track the exact language of
§ 2512, including its safe harbor provisions. Pennsylvania makes
it a felony to intentionally manufacture, sell, distribute, or
advertise an “electronic, mechanical or other device, knowing or
having reason to know that the design of such device renders it
primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception
of a wire, electronic or oral communication.”133 Maine’s statute is
broader; it proscribes the sale of “any device, contrivance, machine
or apparatus designed or commonly used for the interception of
wire or oral communications.”134
As technology has evolved, gaps in the law have become
apparent. Federal and state laws do not cover surveillance tools
devoted to the secret collection of location data. As U.S. Senator Al
Franken has admonished and worked to change, “there is no
federal law banning the secret collection of location data.”135 At the
state level, the rare exception is Section 637.7 of the California
Penal Code, which states that “[n]o person or entity in this state
shall use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or
movement of a person.”136 This provision (and the few others like
132. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-34 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 635 (West 2015);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-302 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-41s (2015); DEL. CODE
tit. 11, § 2403 (2015); D.C. CODE § 23-543 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 934.04 (2015); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-63 (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-43 (2015); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-6703 (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1304 (2015); ME. STAT. tit.
15, § 710 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-403 (2015); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.539f (2015); MINN. STAT. § 626A.03 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 570-A:3 (2015); N.J. STAT. § 2A:156A–5 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-288
(2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-03 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 176.3 (2015);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5705 (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-24 (2015); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-30-55 (West 2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 2015); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-23a-5 (LexisNexis 2015); W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-4 (2015).
133. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5705.
134. ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 710.
135. Press Release, Sen. Al Franken, After Pressure from Senator Franken,
Federal Officials Take Action Against Dangerous “Stalking Apps” (Sept. 30, 2014)
(on file with author).
136. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 2015); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1335(a)(8); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.06.
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it) likely has no application to cyber stalking apps because it only
covers electronic tracking devices “attached” to a vehicle or
movable thing.137
We have seen some prosecutions of individuals responsible for
the production of devices primarily designed to facilitate the
stealth interception of communications. At the federal level, the
owners of spy stores have been convicted of selling voice recorders
and transmitters hidden in pens, light bulbs, wall plugs, and
calculators.138 Defendants have been imprisoned for selling
wireless telephone microphones whose small size made them easy
to hide and whose design permitted remote, clandestine
monitoring.139
Nonetheless, prosecutions remain extremely rare. Despite the
increasing prevalence of spyware, federal prosecutors have only
brought a handful of cases.140 In 2005, a San Diego student, Carlos
Perez-Melara, was indicted for manufacturing, selling, and
advertising spyware programs called “EmailPI” and “Lover
Spy.”141 The program was designed to “catch a cheating lover.” It
sent victims an electronic greeting card that, once opened, would
secretly install a keystroke logger and data-gleaning software. The
program captured email, passwords, documents, and browser
histories and sent reports of them to users on a regular basis. Users
could take control of the watched person’s computer, including
turning on the webcam and deleting or altering files.142 The case,
however, fizzled after the defendant fled the country.
Nearly ten years elapsed before federal prosecutors charged
another spyware producer under § 2512. In September 2014,
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7.
138. United States v. Brio, 143 F.3d 1421, 1430 (11th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 450, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
139. United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 603 (C.D. Ill. 1986).
140. The first case involving spyware was brought in 1997 against Spy Shops
International. The United States Attorney’s Office in Miami, with Assistant U.S.
Attorney Robert Mosbacher in the lead, pursued § 2512 charges against the
defendant for importing and selling spyware designed to be primarily used to
intercept electronic communications surreptitiously. I am grateful to Robert
Mosbacher for talking to me about the case.
141. China Martens, ‘Loverspy’ Creator Indicted, On the Run, IDG NEWS
SERVICE (Aug. 29, 2005).
142. Id.
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federal prosecutors brought § 2512 charges against StealthGenie’s
CEO Hammad Akbar.143 StealthGenie’s spyware app secretly
intercepted communications to and from mobile phones.144 The
company’s marketing material explained that its app is “100%
undetectable” and “runs in the background of the mobile phone
without disturbing any of the other functions running.”145
StealthGenie promised to help subscribers “uncover the truth” by
“secretly monitoring all the activities of your loved one or
employee, and let you know their location at all times.”146 The
federal indictment alleged that the app’s target population was
“spousal cheat: Husband/Wife or boyfriend/girlfriend suspecting
their other half of cheating or any other suspicious behavior or if
they just want to monitor them.”147 A federal judge issued a
temporary restraining order authorizing the FBI to disable the site
hosting StealthGenie.148
Law enforcement has been slow to prosecute the distributors
of spyware despite their life-threatening implications and illegal
nature.149 At the state level, criminal law’s enforcement has been
virtually nonexistent.150 Why so few state and federal
prosecutions?
One reason for the low number of prosecutions may be the
difficulty in proving that a device is primarily designed for the
secret interception of electronic communications.151 Privacy
143. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Pakistani Man Indicted for
Selling StealthGenie Spyware App (Sept. 29, 2014) (on file with the author).
144. Id. Federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia brought the
case because StealthGenie is hosted by a data center in Ashburn, Virginia. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Zetter, supra note 26.
148. FBI Arrests StealthGenie Mobile Spyware App Maker, Disables Website,
FBI NEWS BLOG (Sept. 20, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/fbiarrests-stealthgenie-spyware-app-maker-disables-site (last visited Sept. 20,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. Zetter, supra note 26.
150. My research assistants and I searched Westlaw and Lexis for state law
cases involving the prosecution of providers of stealth spying equipment and could
not find any.
151. See Dempsey, supra note 103, at 111 (arguing that “Congress should
delete the word ‘primarily,’ at least as it affects manufacture, sale, assembly, and
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advocate James Dempsey blames the small number of § 2512
prosecutions on the fact that it is hard to demonstrate that
equipment is “primarily” designed for stealth interception of
communications.152
Another reason is that law enforcement generally devotes too
few resources to combating domestic violence and stalking. State
and local police departments receive little training about relevant
laws and technologies. Law enforcement’s lackluster response is
also related to the view that cyber stalking is no big deal.153 Law
enforcement officers often advise victims that they have more
important matters to address, such as murder and child porn, and
lack the resources for cyber stalking cases.154
Additional problems include the fact that cyber stalking and
domestic abuse are under-reported. Because victims do not think
that law enforcement will take their complaints seriously, they
often do not seek out its help.155 There is also a significant lack of
digital forensic resources resulting in proof problems for
prosecutors.156 Lastly, as has long been true, society has difficulty
in quantifying the harm caused by privacy violations, which leads
to failure by law enforcement to prioritize this type of
enforcement.157
advertisement”).
152. See id. (noting the difficulty in proving that a device that is capable of
intercepting cellular and a range of other frequencies is “primarily useful” for the
interception of wireless telephone conversations).
153. CITRON, supra note 30, at 185.
154. See Amanda Hess, A Former FBI Agent on Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute
Gamergate Trolls, SLATE (Oct. 17, 1014, 4:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/17/gamergate_threats_why_it_s_so_hard_to_prosecute_t
he_people_targeting_zoe.html (last visited June 20, 2015) (“Cases that posed a
serious risk of physical harm or a significant loss of property were prioritized, as
were threats to children.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Although law enforcement agencies often dismiss cyber stalking victims because
they claim they are too busy investigating terrorism or murder, FBI statistics tell
another story. From 2010–2013, the top three crimes pursued by the FBI involved
aggravated assault, drug crimes, and larceny theft.
155. CITRON, supra note 30, at 183–84.
156. See, e.g., supra note 150 and accompanying text (explaining that a
significant barrier to recovery in common law tort cases is courts’ refusal to
recognize privacy harms as justiciable or cognizable in the absence of financial
harm).
157. See, e.g., id. (noting that the author’s Westlaw and Lexis searches for
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We cannot be sure of the precise reasons for the underenforcement of criminal law. But we can confidently say that
criminal law has been rarely used to punish the production of
equipment that has little use beyond the stealth interception of
communications data.
C. Consumer Protection Laws
What about consumer protection statutes? Under § 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC can seek injunctive or
other equitable relief against companies engaging in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.158 Acts are considered unfair if they
cause or are likely to cause substantial injury that consumers
cannot reasonably avoid and their countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition does not outweigh the costs.159
Under its § 5(a) authority, the FTC has brought charges
against spyware and mobile app providers engaged in the
surreptitious collection of communications data. In 2012, the FTC
alleged that DesignerWare LLC, a company providing spyware to
rent-to-own computer providers, engaged in unfair and deceptive
practices. The company’s software secretly logged a computer
user’s keystrokes, photographed anyone in view of the computer’s
webcam, and tracked the computer’s geolocation.160 In 2013,
DesignerWare entered into a consent decree with the FTC,
agreeing not to gather data from computers without giving clear
and prominent notice of such tracking at the time the computer is
rented and without obtaining affirmative express consent.161

state law cases involving the prosecution of providers of stealth spying equipment
produced no results).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (2012).
159. Id. § 45(n).
160. Complaint, In re Matter of DesignerWare, LLC (2013), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130415designerw
arecmpt.pdf.
161. Decision and Order, In re Matter of DesignerWare, LLC (2013), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130415designer
waredo.pdf.
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Similarly, in 2008, the FTC brought a suit against CyberSpy
Software, which sold a keylogger program called RemoteSpy.162
RemoteSpy could be disguised as an innocuous attachment to an
email. Once an email recipient clicked on the attachment, the
program would be installed onto the recipient’s computer. The
spyware generated records of all of the keystrokes typed, images
captured, passwords provided, and sites visited on the infected
computers. To access the information intercepted and gathered by
the spyware, users would log into a site maintained by the
defendants.163 CyberSpy Software urged its users to employ stealth
email services to send the software so recipients could not identify
them.164
In 2010, CyberSpy entered into a consent decree with the FTC,
in which it agreed to refrain from promoting, selling, or
distributing software that would be installed on computers without
the knowledge and express consent of the computers’ owners.165
The defendant agreed to install a popup notice that clearly and
prominently disclosed the function of the software to computer
owners.166 It also pledged to retain records about its customers,
including names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses,
payments, and items purchased.167
Beyond spyware, the FTC has signaled that apps collecting
geolocation data owe special duties to users.168 The FTC brought
an action against a flashlight app developer for failing to notify
users before the app was downloaded that their geolocation
162. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v.
CyberSpy Software, LLC, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2008).
163. Press Release, FTC, Spyware Seller Settles FTC Charges; Order Bars
Marketing of Keylogger Spyware for Illegal Uses (June 2, 2010) (on file with the
author).
164. Preliminary Injunctive Order, FTC v. CyberSpy Software LLC,
No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008).
165. Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, FTC v. CyberSpy
Software, LLC, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015) (discussing the significant risk of privacy harm emanating from
unprotected geolocation data and the need for new laws that account for the
sensitivity of this kind of information).
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information would be collected and shared with third parties.169
The consent decree required the defendant to provide a separate
notice and opt-in consent to consumers before collecting their
geolocation information.170 The consent decree’s lesson was that
consumers must be clearly notified about the collection and
sharing of geolocation data, the reasons for the collection and
sharing, and the identity of third parties with whom geolocation
data will be shared.171
As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have powerfully
argued, the FTC has laid down common law principles for the
protection of consumer privacy.172 FTC settlements in cases
involving DesignerWare LLC, CyberSpy Software,173 Aaron’s
Rental,174 and Android Flashlight app175 make clear the agency’s
169. See Press Release, FTC, Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC
Charges It Deceived Consumers (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www. ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2013/12/android-flashlight-app-developer-settles-ftc-chargesit-deceived (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (noting the FTC’s allegation that “the
company’s privacy policy deceptively failed to disclose that the app transmitted
users’ precise location and unique device identifier to third parties, including
advertising networks”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. See id. (“The settlement also requires the defendants to provide a just-intime disclosure that fully informs consumers when, how, and why their
geolocation information is being collected, used and shared, and requires
defendants to obtain consumers’ affirmative express consent before doing so.”).
171. See id. (stating that consumers should not be left in the dark about how
their information is going to be used).
172. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (contending that the
“FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is functionally equivalent to a body of common law,”
given its breadth and influence on regulation on information privacy in the United
States).
173. Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, FTC v. CyberSpy
Software, LLC, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010).
174. See Aaron’s Rent-to-Own Chain Settles FTC Charges that It Enabled
Computer Spying by Franchisees, FTC (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2013/10/aarons-rent-own-chain-settles-ftc-charges-itenabled-computer (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (noting that the retailer “agreed to
settle FTC charges that it knowingly played a direct and vital role in its
franchisees’ installation and use of software on rental computers that secretly
monitored consumers including by taking webcam pictures of them in their
homes”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
175. Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC Charges It Deceived
Consumer, FTC (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2013/12/android-flashlight-app-developer-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived
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view that spyware and mobile apps collecting communications and
geolocation data should not operate without express consumer
consent. The FTC, however, can only do so much given its limited
resources and power. The agency cannot issue fines under § 5.176
Only if companies violate settlement orders can the FTC pursue
them for monetary penalties.177
What about state Attorneys General and state consumer
protection agencies? Under state unfair and deceptive trade
practice acts, Attorneys General can seek civil penalties and
injunctive relief against spyware app providers’ unfair and
deceptive consumer practices.178 Unfortunately, far too little
attention has been paid to the issue on the state level.
There are important exceptions.179 The Attorney General of
California, Kamala Harris, for instance, has been an aggressive
advocate for online privacy.180 She issued the guidance document
“Privacy on the Go” with recommendations for mobile apps to

(last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
176. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
854 (5th ed. 2014) (noting that there is no initial fining authority under § 5 of the
FTC act).
177. If companies violate the terms of a final order issued by the FTC, then
they could be liable for penalties up to $16,000 per violation. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)
(2012).
178. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (noting that the provision
allows for both monetary damages and injunctive relief in the case of unfair and
deceptive consumer practices).
179. The Attorneys General of Florida, California, and Texas investigated
Designerware for unfair and deceptive practice of secretly spying on computer
renters.
180. See Jason M. Crawford, State AGs and Online Privacy: Trends We Saw
in 2013, LAW360 (Dec. 6, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
493366/state-ags-and-online-privacy-trends-we-saw-in-2013 (last visited on Sept.
20, 2015) (maintaining that Harris has been aggressive in advocating for online
privacy on behalf of California consumers) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Divonne Smoyer & Aaron Lancaster, State AGs: The Most
Important Regulators in the US?, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Nov. 26, 2013),
https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/state-ags-the-most-important-regulatorsin-the-us/ (last visited on Sept. 20, 2015) (noting that with the support and
encouragement of Attorney General Harris, California continues to lead other
states in the field of data privacy protection) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Of late, state Attorneys General have made consumer privacy a
priority including Connecticut, Maryland, Texas, New York, and others. Id.
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safeguard consumer privacy.181 A prominent goal of the AG’s study
was the minimization of consumer surprise.182 AG Harris’s report
called upon mobile app providers to ensure just-in-time notice
about the collection of personal information to reduce the
unexpected collection of consumer data.183 In 2012, AG Harris
created a privacy enforcement task force, which has investigated
mobile app developers for failing to inform users what personal
information they were collecting.184 California’s eCrime Unit has
pursued computer intrusion criminal prosecutions.185
Much more should be done on the state level to combat
stalking apps and their ilk.
IV. Next Steps
This Part lays out a plan of action. The first step focuses on
potential legal reform. The second sketches out possibilities to
enhance the enforcement of existing laws. The last calls for private
efforts to combat cyber stalking apps.

181. KAMALA D. HARRIS, PRIVACY ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
MOBILE ECOSYSTEM (Jan. 2013).
182. See id. (“Recognizing that the legally required general privacy policy is
not always the most effective way to get consumers’ attention, Privacy on the Go
recommends a ‘surprise minimization’ approach.”).
183. See id. (recommending enhanced measures to supplement legally
required privacy policy to alert users about company data practices, possibly
provided through notices “delivered in context and just-in-time”).
184. See Press Release, California Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala
D. Harris Notifies Mobile App Developers of Non-Compliance with California
Privacy Law (Oct. 30, 2012) (noting that the letters are the first step in enforcing
the California Online Privacy Protection Act, which “requires commercial
operators of online services, including mobile and social apps, which collect
personally identifiable information from Californians to conspicuously post a
privacy policy”) (on file with author).
185. For instance, California’s Department of Justice prosecuted George
Bronk for hacking into women’s email and Facebook accounts to steal their nude
photos. Bronk sent the nude photos to the women’s email contacts. Nina Mandell,
Facebook Stalker Turned Email Hacker Sentenced to Four Years in Prison: Sent
Nude Photos of Victims, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 24, 2011), http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/national/facebook-stalker-years-prison-article-1.156894
(last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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A. Updating the Law

Let’s consider potential criminal law reforms. In 2014, Senator
Al Franken proposed the Location Privacy Protection Act
(LPPA).186 The impetus behind the bill was the rise of cyber
stalking apps and their enablement of domestic violence and
stalking.187 A section of the LPPA would extend § 2512’s coverage
to devices that collect geolocation information.188 Congress and
state lawmakers should adopt this proposal. National domestic
violence groups, consumer advocacy groups, the FTC, and the
Department of Justice support the extension of § 2512 to
geolocation data, and for good reason, given the risks
accompanying the disclosure of location data.189
In addition, § 2512 and similar state laws should be broadened
to cover devices whose design renders them “useful” for secret
interception and collection of electronic, wire, and oral
communications (and geolocation data). The more demanding
“primarily useful” standard should be jettisoned as it erects an
unnecessary barrier to criminal penalties.190 Prosecutors may be
reluctant to pursue § 2512 charges because it is hard to prove that
their design renders them “primarily useful” for secret
surveillance. The “primarily useful” standard allows defendants to
point to a device’s legitimate uses (e.g., parents keeping tabs on

186. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014, S. 2171, 113th Cong. § 6 (2014).
187. See id. (proposing criminal penalties for “knowingly and willfully”
disclosing geolocation information about an individual to another individual in
aid of interstate domestic violence or stalking).
188. See id. (prohibiting development and distribution of stalking apps).
189. See Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. (June 4, 2014) (statements of Bea Hanson, Principal Deputy Dir.,
Department of Justice Office on Violence Against Women, and Jessica Rich, Dir.,
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection) (expressing support for the extension of
§ 2512 to geolocation data given the unique risk that unknowing disclosure of
such information poses for individual safety and privacy); Press Release, Senator
Franken’s ‘Stalking Apps’ Bill One Step Closer to Becoming Law (Dec. 13, 2012)
(noting that Franken’s bill “has been endorsed by nearly every national domestic
violence and consumer group in the country”).
190. See Dempsey, supra note 103, at 111 (outlining the difficulty in meeting
the “primarily useful” standard and arguing for its eradication).
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their children) as cover for its illegitimate ones.191 This tough
standard has permitted spying businesses to flourish even as they
market their spying software as “100% undetectable.”
Rather than the “primarily useful” standard, federal and state
wiretapping statutes should cover the provision of devices
“designed for” the stealth interception and collection of
communications and geolocation data. What makes a device highly
likely to invade privacy is its covert nature. We do not need proof
that a tool’s design renders it “primarily useful” for stealth
interception and collection to punish its provision. That a tool is
designed to accomplish surveillance in an undetectable manner is
what makes it illegitimate.192 It should be illegal to manufacture,
sell, or advertise software designed to covertly intercept
communications and location data.
Would eliminating the “primarily useful” requirement deter
the production of devices with legitimate uses? Hardly. As
NNEDV’s Cindy Southworth has argued, apps engaged in
legitimate monitoring—such as the parent worried about a child’s
location or the employer concerned about an employee’s misuse of
her phone—need not disguise their presence.193 A parent can locate
a child if the cell phone’s app database shows that the location app

191. As Senator Franken explained at the Senate Privacy, Technology, and
Law subcommittee hearing on the proposed Location Privacy Protection Act, a
stalking ware provider focused its advertising on people who suspected their
intimates of cheating. Once it became clear that his office was investigating
stalking apps, the company changed its advertising to focus on uses by employers
and parents. Privacy Location Stalking Apps, C-SPAN (June 4, 2014)
http://www.c-span.org/video/?319758-1/privacy-location-stalking-apps
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
192. See Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1401 (2008) (comparing the DMCA to § 2512 and
arguing that “[i]f one characteristic of a tool is especially pernicious and unlikely
to be useful for widespread, legitimate use, a narrow law can be written
criminalizing the creation or distribution of that tool”).
193. See Grant Gross, Mobile Spying Apps Fuel Domestic Violence, U.S.
Senator Says, PC WORLD (June 4, 2014), http://www.pcworld.idg.com.
au/article/546855/mobile_spying_apps_fuel_domestic_violence_us_senator_says/
(last visited on Sept. 20, 2015) (noting that with legitimate parental monitoring
apps the child knows they are being monitored and there is no need for these apps
to hide their presence on mobile phones) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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is running. The same is true for employers who want to check on
employees’ activities during work hours.
Also, apps that do not hide their presence would help ensure
that employers themselves do not run afoul of wiretapping laws.
Suppose that an employer owns the cell phones that it provides to
employees. The employer loads spyware apps on the phones. In
states with two-party consent wiretap laws, the employer is at risk
for prosecution if employees using the phones talk to others on the
phone without getting their consent to being monitored.194
State lawmakers should consider adopting long-arm statutes
that would enable courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
foreign app developers. One approach is to adopt a long-arm
provision that permits prosecutors to pursue defendants whose
software has harmed its citizens or whose services host data in the
state.195
If lawmakers decline to adopt criminal law reforms,
lawmakers could consider imposing record-keeping requirements
for spyware providers that know or have reason to know their
software is used for secret surveillance. Sellers would be required
to keep records of purchases, including detailed information about
their users. We saw record-keeping requirements in the FTC’s
consent decree in the CyberSpy case. The FTC and state agencies
should be given oversight over record-keeping requirements and
the power to seek civil penalties against violators. Criminal
penalties could follow if record-keeping requirements are
ignored.196
Record-keeping requirements could help deter criminal
activity. Because providers would have to keep records about their
194. An employer’s use of spyware would be legitimate under federal and
most state wiretapping laws if the employer monitored the employee’s phone with
the express or implied consent of the employee. Such monitoring would be illegal
in the twelve states that require all parties to a communication to consent to the
interception. Ohm, supra note 192, at 1485. The states that require the consent
of all parties to a communication are California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. Id. at 1486 n.379.
195. Thanks to Venus Johnson and Jeff Rabkin for talking to me about
jurisdictional issues and potential reform efforts in California. At the federal
level, prosecutors asserted their jurisdiction over the StealthGenie CEO on the
company’s hosting of data in Virginia.
196. A similar regulatory scheme applies to the pornography industry under
18 U.S.C. § 2257.
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customers, their records would put them on notice that their
equipment is being used for secret spying. Providers might adopt
measures—such as having icons signaling the presence of apps—
to immunize themselves from criminal liability. Individual
perpetrators might think better of using software to spy on
intimates because the threat of criminal penalty might seem real.
Having to provide detailed information to providers about their
identities might deter some wrongdoing.
Another potential reform is to give the FTC the power to
pursue civil penalties against entities whose devices are designed
to intercept private communications and location data without
detection. In testifying in support of Senator Franken’s Location
Privacy Protection Act of 2014, the FTC’s Chief of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection pressed the bill’s supporters to give the FTC
the ability to enforce the civil penalty provision of the bill.197 Civil
penalties could serve as a potent deterrent to stalking app
producers.198
What about private rights of action? Under current law,
parties who know that they have been spied upon likely cannot sue
the companies that enable the privacy invasions.199 A main barrier
to recovery in common law tort cases is courts’ refusal to recognize
privacy harms as justiciable or cognizable in the absence of
financial harm.200 State and federal lawmakers could overcome
these problems by recognizing a statutory private right of action
against entities providing, selling, and advertising devices
designed to secretly intercept communications and location data.
197. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Privacy, Technology and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
(June 4, 2014) (statement of Jessica Rich, Dir., FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection).
198. Legislative permission would lend democratic imprimatur to agency
action. The FTC has faced criticism about its enforcement efforts under § 5(a) on
the grounds that the unfair and deceptive practices statutory language fails to
provide adequate notice to defendants of what constitutes appropriate behavior.
The Federal Trade Commission and its Section 5 Authority: Prosecutor, Judge,
and Jury: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
113th Cong. (July 24, 2014) (statement of Prof. Gerard M. Stegmaier).
199. See generally Luis v. Zang, 2013 WL 811816 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2013)
(holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2520 did not provide a private right of action for § 2512
violations).
200. DANIEL J. SOLOVE , UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).
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What about concerns that legal reform will impede
innovation? The legal agenda proposed here is not designed to
impede legitimate business practices. In our digital age, personal
data is routinely collected, processed, and shared. Behavioral
advertisers personalize ads based on online browsing habits.201
Social networks amass reservoirs of personal data including
user-provided location information and message histories.202 These
entities engage in these practices for commercial purposes,
whether to sell advertising or to enhance user experiences, not for
illegal ends. The FTC common law and best practices set forth by
some state Attorneys General have set forth basic fair information
practice principles, including notice and transparency for the
collection, use, and sharing of consumer data. Such practices can
proceed because consumers are given clear and prominent notice
(or opt-in consent) before personal data is collected.
These commercial enterprises have little in common with
businesses that enable individuals to spy on another person’s
private communications and location without detection.203 They
sell tools that enable the continuous and secret tracking of a
person’s communications and location by private spies.204 Spying
Incorporated is distinct from commercial practices that adhere to
fair information practice principles, and so in turn are the civil and
criminal penalties that attach to it.205
201. See Alexis C. Madrigal, I'm Being Followed: How Google—and 104 Other
Companies—Are Tracking Me on the Web, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/02/im-being-followed-howgoogle-151-and-104-other-companies-151-are-tracking-me-on-the-web/253758/
(last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (“They can offer targeted ads based on how users act
(behavioral), who they are (demographic), where they live (geographic), and who
they seem like online (lookalike), as well as something they call ‘social
proximity.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
202. See id. (noting that these companies amass this data with the stated
purpose of delivering more relevant advertising to consumers that makes more
money for companies).
203. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (noting that the former do not
seemingly promote nefarious ends whereas the latter do).
204. See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text (noting that the spying
recorded keystrokes, images captured, passwords provided, sites visited on the
infected computers, and other information).
205. See supra note 198 (noting that such applications can cause serious and
tangible physical harm to individuals, and not simply just harm their privacy
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B. Enforcement Efforts

Without question, a legal agenda must be paired with support
for law enforcement. Law enforcement needs access to digital
forensic expertise and training.206 Police officers need to better
understand the dangers of stalking apps, investigatory techniques,
and available laws.207
In a world of limited resources, the difficulty is identifying
additional funding sources. It is expensive to hire digital forensics
experts for each and every local police force. One possibility is for
localities to join together to allocate money for digital forensic
resources. Local law enforcement agencies could share access to
experts. Another potential source of funding is the monetary
penalties stemming from convictions under § 2512 and similar
state laws. To the extent that § 2512 and similar state laws are
enforced, the fines collected from convicted defendants could be
diverted to funding digital forensic specialists.
Another avenue to encourage enforcement is the mandatory
collection of statistics about investigations and prosecutions of
§ 2512 and state laws. Mandatory reporting rules would help shine
light on what law enforcement is and is not doing to combat cyber
stalking app providers. Interested advocacy groups could bring
publicity to gaps in enforcement, garnering the interest of elected
officials including state Attorneys General and district attorneys.
C. Private Sector Solutions
To be sure, legislative reform may move slowly and the
enforcement of existing criminal law may make only small
advances. In the meanwhile, private sector providers should work
on other innovative solutions.
Consider the efforts by Apple and Google to ensure end-to-end
encryption of their devices to protect against unwarranted
interests).
206. See Hess, supra note 154 (noting that law enforcement must receive more
training and direction on how to tackle the harms posed by spying technologies).
207. See id. (arguing that state and local police departments receive little
training about relevant laws and emerging spying technologies).
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governmental intrusion.208 Smart phone manufacturers and ISPs
might extend their efforts to protect consumers’ privacy to include
the adoption of technologies that make it difficult to install
undetectable spyware. There may indeed be consumer demand for
such a move. We have seen public support for encrypted cell phones
to resist the spying eyes of government.209 There may be strong
consumer demand for devices that are not vulnerable to spyware.
V. Conclusion
The time to strike against stalking apps and their ilk is now.
With the increasing adoption of biometric technologies, wearable
monitors, and networked home devices, our cell phones will amass
an unimaginably detailed record of our lives.210 As spyware
proliferates, stalkers, domestic abusers, and identity thieves will
have access to those intimate reservoirs of our personal data. The
consequences will be grave. We need to confront the issue with all
potential tools, including criminal and civil penalties. The private
sector can play its role as well, for the good of consumers and
society.

208. See, e.g., Kevin Poulson, Apple’s iPhone Encryption Technology is a
Godsend, Even if Cops Hate It, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2014, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/10/golden-key/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (“With an
eye to market demand, the company has taken a bold step to the side of privacy,
making strong crypto the default for the wealth of personal information stored on
the iPhone.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
209. See id. (maintaining that these enhanced safety protocols are being
driven by consumer demand).
210. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“Modern cell
phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all
they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”); FTC Staff
Report, Mobile Privacy Disclosures, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federaltrade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf.
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